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Abstract
Purpose – One explicit leadership role the chief executive officer (CEO) can play during crisis is to
assume the role of being the organization’s spokesperson. What remains unclear is at what point of the
crisis should the CEO step up and how does that impact crisis communication? The purpose of this
paper is to examine this question.
Design/methodology/approach – The meta-analysis method is used to combine different data in
various studies of one topic into one comprehensive study. More than 30 crises are meta-analyzed.
Findings – The CEO needs to step up to revise earlier statements or when the integrity of the
organization is questioned. Additionally, the CEO should step up at the beginning of the crisis if the
crisis pertains to organizational transgression or when the crisis becomes unbearable to organizational
reputation. As counter-intuitive as it may, CEOs should refrain from stepping up at the height of the
crisis.
Research limitations/implications – It is an exploratory study. Some cases have lesser
information to analyze than others.
Practical implications – Instructive for both corporate communications practitioners and CEOs as
they have a framework to guide them on when the CEOs should step up, and when the presence of
corporate communications would suffice.
Originality/value – Little has been studied to clarify the exact nature, role, and impact of the CEO as
organization spokesperson in crises. This paper provides the initial template.
Keywords Leadership, Chief executives, Corporate communications
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
If there was a cardinal rule in crisis communication, it must certainly be the criticality
and centrality of crisis leadership. Implicit in the leadership literature is the role of the
chief executive officer (CEO) in helping the organization overcome crisis. Besides
setting the direction for the organization, the CEO re-establishes confidence among
stakeholders. Boin et al. (2005) enumerated five critical tasks the leadership, which
includes the CEO, performs: sense-making of the crisis, making decisions to deal with
the crisis, framing and making meaning of the crisis to stakeholders, terminating the
crisis to restore normalcy to the organization, as well as steering the organization to
learn from the crisis.
Additionally, one explicit role the CEO should play is to assert leadership by
assuming the role of the organization’s spokesperson (Englehardt et al., 2004; Littlefield
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and Quenette, 2007; Mintzberg, 1998; Nadler, 2006; Petersen and Martin, 1996).
A visible CEO (for easier referencing in this paper, we shall use the term, CEO, to refer
to such persons of authority and power, including president or managing director for
corporate entity or non-profit organization or heads of government) would demonstrate
the importance the organization places on the crisis and dispel any notion that the
organization might renege its responsibility to stakeholders (Ulmer et al., 2007).
Wilson and Patterson (1987) argued that organizations should identify one key
spokesperson to ensure that the organization speaks with one voice. Assigning
multiple spokespersons would make image repair more diffused and ambiguous,
argued Barrett (2005). While the credibility of the CEO as an organization’s
spokesperson is unquestioned, what remains unclear is at what point of the crisis
should the CEO assume this role and how does this impact crisis communication.
Central to these questions is that, given that the CEO has myriad portfolios to oversee,
should the CEO step up to be the organization spokesperson at the hint of a crisis, in
every crisis? To do so would arguably be an unwise use of the CEO’s time. If so, what
types of crises can the responsibililty of being spokesperson be relegated to corporate
communications while the CEO leads from within?
This study examines the conditions in which the CEO should assume the
spokesperson’s role through meta-analysis of more than 30 cases that have been
empirically tested in studies. These cases are, in turn, tested using image repair theory.
Seeger (2002, 2006) argued that understanding the crisis situation is an important step
to assess organizational response. Drawing on this insight, this study aims to explore
the conditions in which the CEO should step up to be the organization’s spokesperson
by examining crisis types, using Diers’ (2007) taxonomy of crisis types. The key
research questions examined include the circumstances in which the CEO become the
organization spokesperson, the strategies used, and at what point should the CEO
become the organization spokesperson.
The significance of this study is threefold. First, by studying the circumstances in
which the CEO should step up as organization spokesman, it is hoped that this
exploratory study can provide the initial operational framework for CEOs on when
they should step up. Second, this framework is concomitantly instructive for corporate
communications practitioners in organizations as a secondary objective of the study is
to understand the circumstances in which it would be sufficient for practitioners to step
up instead of activating the CEO. Last but not least, this study clarifies the roles of
CEOs in crisis. For instance, Pang (2006) argued in his conflict positioning
conceptualization that if the dominant coalition, including the CEO, was involved in
crisis, it may lead to the organization adopting a more accommodative stance if it was
not hindered by proscriptive factors, which in turn lead to the adoption of more
accommodative strategies. What was not explored in Pang’s (2006) conceptualization
was when the CEO should be visibly involved. This study sheds light on the degree of
involvement and the specific roles and impact the CEO would have in crisis.
Literature review
Crises that the CEO will have to deal with
Ulmer et al. (2007, p. 7, italics in text) defined crisis as a “specific, unexpected, and
non-routine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and threaten
or are perceived to threaten an organization’s high-priority goals.” Scholars have
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attempted to categorize the different types of crises using different measures. Pearson
and Mitroff (1993), for instance, classified crisis typologies according to the crises’
shared characteristics. Coombs and Holladay (2002) classified crisis typologies based
on crisis response strategies. Diers’ (2007) study consolidated the existing literature
and classified them into three broad categories, namely:
(1) organizational transgressions;
(2) organizational events; and
(3) events/actions outside of the organization locus and control.
Drawing from past literature, Diers (2007) also identified 18 “types” of crisis that can be
broadly categorized into the three overarching classifications.
The first broad classification is that of organizational transgressions, or crises which
can be attributable to the organization, be it through intentional or unintentional actions
(Diers, 2007). The second classification is that of organizational events, or crises which
can possibly (but not necessarily) be in the organization’s locus on control, and may or
may not have a negative impact on the organization target audience, but nonetheless is a
crisis to the organization. The last classification is that of events/actions outside of the
organization locus of control, which refers to an event that the organization has no
control over, but the resultant impact still brings about crises which the organization has
to address. In this study, Diers’ (2007) typology is used because it is arguably the most
comprehensive classification. Examining crisis through typologies affords researchers
the context to determine organizational responses (Coombs and Holladay, 1996, 2002;
Diers, 2007; Hearit, 1999; Pearson and Mitroff, 1993).
Image repair theory
Understanding what communication strategies the CEO as the organization’s
spokesperson uses during crisis is the theoretical lens in which this study was carried
out, against the backdrop of crisis typologies. The theoretical lens used here is Benoit’s
(1995) image repair theory. In the theory, there are five general image repair strategies,
denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness of event, corrective action, and
mortification. Embedded in each of the general strategies are sub-strategies.
Denial. There are two ways by which an organization can issue a denial: simple
denial, which entails denying the action for which the rhetor (individual speaker or
organization) is being accused of Taylor and Caldiero (2005), and shift the blame, which
entails arguing that another organization is responsible for the act (Benoit, 1997).
Evasion of responsibility. There are four ways by which an organization can evade
responsibility: provocation, defeasibility, accident, and good intentions. In provocation,
the rhetor claims that the issue/offensive action is merely a reaction to a previous
offensive action by another organization (Brinson and Benoit, 1996). In defeasibility,
the organization claims that there was a lack of information about the situation or lack
of control over certain elements thereof (Benoit, 1997; Brinson and Benoit, 1996),
resulting in the offensive event. In accident, the organization claims that the situation
was brought about by an accident (Benoit, 1997). If the public believes that the
offensive action was caused by an accident, they are more likely not to blame the
organization for it, reducing the impact on the organization’s image (Benoit, 1997).
Last, in good intentions, an organization claims that the offensive action was initially
performed with good intentions (Brinson and Benoit, 1996).
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Reducing offensiveness of event. There are six ways by which organizations can
attempt to reduce the offensiveness of an event. Bolstering, whereby the organization
attempts to restore positive feelings towards them by reminding the public of their
positive attributes and by expressing sympathy (Benoit, 1997). Minimization, whereby
an organization attempts to downplay the event and make the audience perceive the
event to be not as severe as it seems to be (Benoit, 1997). Differentiation, whereby an
organization attempts to distinguish the event from other similar, but more offensive
situations (Brinson and Benoit, 1996). Transcendence, whereby the organization
attempts to place the situation in a more positive light (Benoit, 1997; Brinson and Benoit,
1996). Attack the accuser, whereby the organization attempts to reduce the credibility of
the accuser and to mute their initial accusations (Benoit, 1997). Lastly, compensation,
whereby the organization attempts to provide some sort of remuneration (whether
financially or some other form) to the affected publics (Taylor and Caldiero, 2005).
Corrective action. When an organization is facing a crisis, they can pledge to correct
the situation by restoring the state of conditions to the status quo, and committing to
prevent the crisis from reoccurring (Benoit, 1997).
Mortification. The last strategy entails accepting responsibility for the offensive act,
apologizing and asking for forgiveness (Benoit, 1997; Brinson and Benoit, 1996; Taylor
and Caldiero, 2005).
Against this backdrop, this study examines:
RQ1. What crisis types were the case studies categorized into?
RQ2a. Under what circumstances did the CEO become the organization
spokesperson?
RQ2b. What were the image repair strategies used by the CEO?
RQ2c. How successful were the strategies used?
RQ3a. At what point should the CEO become the organization spokesperson?
RQ3b. What impact does this have on the crisis?
Method
This study begins with a meta-analysis of literature on crisis communication. The
meta-analysis method is useful to combine different data in various studies of one topic
into one comprehensive study (Dahlel, 2003; Neill, 2006; Wimmer and Dominick, 2006).
While it may be useful to survey organizations affected by crisis, the authors argue
that as an exploratory study, it would begin by exploring existing case studies and
identify the various elements in each crisis. Pompper (2007) argued that a review of
literature specific to a field, in this case, crisis, would yield a further understanding of
its development and identify future areas of research. It is through further detailed
examination of these cases that this study seeks to understand the importance of the
CEO in crisis communication.
Data collection
Literature review. As each crisis was unique in its own way, it was important to study
as many case studies as possible to understand the various circumstances in which the
organization was plunged into a crisis. The first order search criterion centered on the
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crisis literature. These cases were categorized into the different crisis typologies using
Dier’s (2007) framework. In all, 33 cases were identified. While the literature search was
not restricted to any particular time frame, attention was paid to ensure that all
relevant crises types in the typology had at least one case.
Wimmer and Dominick (1997) asserted that in-depth study of cases were time-tested
means of evaluating business practices. Stake (1995) argued that case studies enabled
researchers to understand the embedded ness and interactions these processes had
with their larger contexts. Case studies, in the context of organizational studies, are
in-depth studies of people, processes, and protocol (Stacks, 2002). The essence of case
study is, thus, to “illuminate a set of decisions, why they were taken and how they
were implemented, and to what result,” argued Yin (2003, p. 12).
News articles. The second order search centered on news articles. Further
excavations of the cases identified earlier were explored by diving into the news
articles relating to them.
Data analysis
Analyzing context. The purpose of case studies is to empirically investigate a
“contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” and address a “situation in
which the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin,
1993, p. 59). Each case was analyzed for their intrinsic value (Stake, 1998) in detail and
in their unique contexts.
Analyzing strategies. Some of the studies examined were empirical tests using image
repair strategies. For the others that were not, the authors examined them by applying
the image repair theory to identify the strategies used. This was especially so for news
articles selected. A two-level approach was used to study the cases. The first level
entailed re-visiting well-documented journal articles that used prominent crisis
situations as case studies for application of image repair strategies. The second level
used news articles that either furthered the understanding of the studied cases.
Journal articles with image repair strategies used as a framework provided ready
resource into the insights of the thinking and strategies of the organizations at that
time. For the news articles chosen, Benoit’s (1995) image repair theory was used as a
framework.
Findings and discussion
RQ1 examined what types of crises organizations can face while RQ2a-RQ2c
examined the circumstances in which the CEO became the organization spokesperson
and what image repair strategies have been used. These would be examined
concurrently.
This section is distilled into three categories. First, situations which required the
CEO to step up; second, situations when the CEO should have stepped up; and three,
situations where there the CEO did not and need not step up. Throughout this section,
image repair strategies used were italicized to enable easier identification and
processing.
When the CEO needs to step up
Accidents (technical or human error). In May 1996, Valujet found itself in this position
when its plane crashed shortly after takeoff, an accident which resulted in the deaths of
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110 passengers and crew members. Englehardt et al. (2004) found that mislabeled
oxygen canisters, which resulted in a leak and a fire, led to the accident. Civil aviation
authorities (like the NSTB) and Sabretech, a contractor with Valujet, alongside family
victims, were all embroiled in the crisis. Valujet engaged in shifting responsibility to
Sabretech for the canister but this was met with little success (Englehardt et al., 2004).
The President of Valujet, Lewis Jordon, stepped up immediately, serving as the
organization’s primary spokesperson at the press conference on May 11, 1996 (on the
day of the crash) (Englehardt et al., 2004). He utilized bolstering by empathizing with
the families of the victims, and corrective action by announcing the measures they
would be taking to ensure the safety of their passengers. Valujet’s crisis
communication efforts in this situation were largely lauded (Englehardt et al., 2004).
It can be inferred that the CEO’s appearance to make a statement can be seen as a
good move by the organization. Accidents resulting in death or injury with which the
organization is perceived to have locus of control (Coombs, 1995) will undoubtedly
cause the publics to rally against the organization. The CEO’s appearance and his
statements would set the stage for how the organization would tackle the crisis.
Organizational misdeed with no injuries. In 1987, car manufacturer Chrysler was
accused of disconnecting the odometers of brand new cars, allowing executives to use
the car and then eventually selling these off as brand new (Holusha, 1987). CEO
Lee Iacocca argued that though it was not illegal to do so, it was bad judgment and
a mistake (Hearit, 1994). Intel, on the contrary, was found to have released the
Pentium chip, despite knowing that it may cause calculation errors. CEO Andrew
Grove initially issued a statement in an online IT community to try to minimize the
accusation saying that the error could only occur once in 27,000 years of use (Hearit,
1999). He issued a challenge that if any user had to perform sophisticated enough
calculations for the error to be significant, Intel would replace his chip. Subsequently,
the error was found to occur more frequently than Intel had claimed, occurring once
every 24 days (Hearit, 1999). Soon after, Grove announced that consumers could
exchange their Pentium chip with a new one (Hearit, 1999).
As the transgression was clearly intentionally committed by the organization, the
CEO had to come out to assure the publics that the organization was sincerely
remorseful for their actions. However, by initially appearing somewhat defensive, Intel
CEO Grove received much criticism. He was publicly proven wrong and that added to
the severity of the situation.
Mortification, corrective action, and bolstering often characterized the strategies
employed when the organization found its hand “caught in the cookie jar,” to use
layman parlance. Bolstering strategy that remind people of the organization’s
longstanding good track record and relationship with their consumers may deflect the
impact of their outright apology.
Organizational misdeed with injuries. In July 1991, Dow Corning Corporation faced a
crisis from the sale of its silicon-breast implants. When the FDA demanded
Dow Corning to show proof of the safety of its implants, Dow Corning responded by
denying. FDA continued to challenge Dow Corning and it was met with denials,
minimization, attacking the accuser, and bolstering strategies (Brinson and Benoit,
1996). Later, documents revealed that Dow Corning was, indeed, aware of the risks.
When new CEO Keith McKennon came on board, he immediately stepped up, and used
mortification and corrective action strategies to soothe public sentiments.
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The apologetic and conciliatory tone used reduced the attention by the FDA and the
media considerably (Brinson and Benoit, 1996).
Here, the CEO only stepped up at the peak of the crisis, but this was not sufficient to
placate the key audiences. It was only with the appointment of a new CEO who
promptly engaged in a dramatic shift in response strategies, or what Pang (2006)
argued to be from less accommodative set of strategies to more accommodative set of
strategies, that allowed Dow Corning to gain some measure of success in image repair
(Brinson and Benoit, 1996).
Workplace violence. In 1996, there was class action sexual harassment lawsuit
against Mitsubishi Motors (MMMA). When the crisis erupted on April 9, MMMA
presented a corporate spokesperson to manage the crisis. The organization’s initial
stand was a firm denial. That action resulted in the split of employees’ sympathies,
with some groups supporting the women who filed the class action, and some
supporting the organization. In the first 15 days of the crisis, a corporate executive was
the spokesperson. Later, CEO Tsuneo Ohinouye announced that MMMA would be
settling the case and admitted that sexual harassment cases had been filed since the
plant opened in 1986 (Pomerenke, 1998). He also announced changes in MMMA’s
corporate policies.
Because the organization had initially denied all the charges, the situation spiraled
out of control after facts that showed otherwise emerged. Pomerenke (1998) asserted
that this denial and defensiveness might have distorted the messages sent to the
employees and the public. The CEO’s mortification strategies and promises of
corrective action alleviated the tension and allowed MMMA to settle the case and move
forward.
Challenges. In November 1996, Texaco was accused of racism (Eichenwald, 1996)
when a secret tape of its four top executives making racist remarks was released to the
media. Texaco’s chairman, Peter I. Bijur, stepped up immediately. He issued a press
release, and sent letters and a video message to all employees (Brinson and Benoit,
1999). The following day, he appeared on ABC’s Nightline to address the issue. Bijur’s
initial press release contained bolstering and corrective action strategies, first
reiterating that Texaco did not condone racist behavior, and secondly, the promise that
an investigation was underway and that appropriate action would be taken if the
allegations were confirmed. During the interview on Nightline, Bijur employed similar
strategies, reiterating the same message, and included mortification as well, by
apologizing to all African-Americans, employees and citizens of the country alike.
Finally, he laid the foundation to appropriately shift the blame to the few executives
involved and isolate them from the rest of the organization (Brinson and Benoit, 1999).
The end result was telling: Stock prices rebounded, boycotts were called off and, in a
short span of time, negative press and criticisms died down (Brinson and Benoit, 1999).
Bijur’s image repair efforts were evaluated to be successful (Brinson and Benoit, 1999).
When the CEO should have stepped up
Illegal corporate behavior. In 2001, investment banking giant Merrill Lynch was
investigated of banking fraud by New York State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer
(Hearit and Brown, 2004). Nearly a year later, the crisis reached its peak when Spitzer
accused Merrill Lynch of giving “tainted” advice to clients (McGeehan, 2002b),
purposely misleading brokerage clients to invest in “junk” stocks, and helping retain
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poorly performing companies as investment banking clients to boost their bottom line
(Hearit and Brown, 2004). Soon after, the organization issued statements denying the
accusations and attacked Spitzer by minimizing the evidence he presented (McGeehan,
2002c). Official statements were released via unnamed executives (McGeehan, 2002c;
Morgenson, 2002).
Two weeks after Spitzer’s announcement, the CEO, David Komansky, stepped up
and apologized for the behavior of some of Merrill’s analysts and that admitted their
actions were not in accordance to their standard practices (McGeehan, 2002a). His
statement could be seen as an act of mortification, and, by promising to change policies
involving analysts, corrective action. In a similar case, trading organization Putnam
also took some time to address the issue to their key publics. Only when its executives
were charged did the CEO, Larry Lasser, apologize to its clients (Caffrey et al., 2007).
In both cases, the CEO stepped up at the height of the crisis, issued the corporate
apology, and subsequently left the organization. However, it is apparent that their
appearances were needed to assuage its key stakeholders, clients and shareholders.
Legal implications aside, when possible, it is argued that the CEO has to step up to
re-establish faith in the organization. The perception of fraud hits at the very integrity
of an organization and any threats to this can potentially be fatal.
Megadamage. On March 24, 1989, the Exxon-Valdez ran aground in the Prince
William Sound in Alaska, spilling millions of gallons of crude oil into the ocean and
causing an ecological disaster of enormous magnitude, affecting marine life, as well as
the livelihood of many fishermen operating in the area (Pauly and Hutchinson, 2005).
Exxon engaged heavily in shifting the blame, trying to pinpoint slow recovery efforts
on the Coast Guard for their slow approval processes. They also tried to shift the blame
to the captain of the ship, who was purportedly drunk at the time of the incident
(Brinson and Benoit, 1999). Although Exxon did eventually engage in corrective action
(spent over two billion dollars to clean up the oil spill), they did not actively publicize
their efforts (Seitel, 1994). Throughout the episode, their CEO Lawrence Rawl was not
actively involved in the crisis (Pauly and Hutchinson, 2005). When he did appear, he
merely explained what the cleanup efforts entailed and appeared aloof and uncaring
(Pauly and Hutchinson, 2005). It took Exxon’s chairman a full week to issue a public
statement and ten days before it apologized for its role in the crisis (Seitel, 2004).
It can be inferred that in a megadamage situation, it is imperative that the CEO step
up to deliver a public statement to calm the situation. By virtue of the authority of the
office, it will also portray the organization to be in control of the situation. Had Rawl
appeared earlier to take responsibility, Exxon might not have faced such a damning
public relations nightmare.
When the CEO did not – and need not – step up
Strikes. In the 1997 UPS strike, it initially designated its chief negotiator to be the
spokesperson, but when the strike started attracting a lot of media attention, the
organization started considering CEO James Kelly to step up (Miller, 1999). However,
Kelly had only joined the organization seven months prior to the strike, and the
organization deemed him unprepared for the media spotlight. UPS eventually
designated its national spokespersons to handle the media onslaught.
It is argued that strikes are internal organizational crises that devolve into the
public sphere because of the clamor by the strikers. Because of the nature of the
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conflict, the CEO does not need to address the general public, unless the reputation of
the organization is put on the line because of smear campaigns and increased media
attention. Kumar (2001) argued that media coverage of strikes were generally favorable
to the organization, so the organization need not generate unnecessary attention to
themselves by “washing their dirty laundry” in public.
Rumor. In 1998, Pepsi accused Coke of using intimidation to restrict competition
(CNN Money, 1998), and filed an anti-trust lawsuit against them for it. Coke responded
by using simple denial. The case was dismissed two years later (Winter, 2000). At the
forefront was Coke’s spokesperson Bill Hensel.
In cases of rumor and assuming that the rumor was baseless, it can be posited that
the CEO does not need to step up to address the issue. The truth of the matter will
eventually come to light, and rigorous defending on the part of a credible spokesperson
would suffice. More imperative is the organization’s attempt to address it early on.
Letting baseless rumors fester may lead to them being entrenched as reality.
Product recall (technical or human error). In August 2007, Mattel CEO Robert Eckert
immediately issued a statement following the announced recall of Mattel toys when
they were found to have been made with lead paint. Eckert outlined corrective actions
and apologized (Mattel, 2007), further bolstering Mattel’s position.
Product recalls due to technical breakdowns do not necessarily incriminate
organizations, so the appearance of the CEO is merely to create and/or strengthen a
bond with their consumers and key publics. In this case, it is not necessary for CEO to
address the public as long as the thrust of the image repair strategy remains directed
towards bolstering their image to consumers and appropriate corrective actions are
implemented.
Malevolence/product tampering. The case of the Tylenol tampering, which has
become a landmark in crisis communication study (Falconi, 2007; Pauly and Hutchison,
2005; Trujillo and Toth, 1987), began in September 1982. Deaths occurred, caused by
cyanide-laced Tylenol pills. CEO James Burke immediately took charge. More
importantly, he availed himself to the media (Pauly and Hutchison, 2005). He protected
the image of Tylenol by successfully employing simple denial and shifting the blame
strategies, ensuring that the media and the publics were aware that the incidents were
caused by tampering and not an inherent flaw in Tylenol’s manufacturing (Pauly and
Hutchison, 2005). Still, he issued a massive recall of all Tylenol capsules and introduced
a new tamper proof container when they later re-released the product (Pauly and
Hutchison, 2005).
Because the case of the Tylenol tampering has been found to be an act of malevolence
by a third party, a corporate spokesperson, instead of the CEO, would be equally fit to
speak on behalf of the organization.
Hostile takeovers/mergers and failed mergers. Reber et al. (2003) analyzed the hostile
takeover of Conrail by Norfolk Southern Corporation in 1996. This event started in 1996
when Conrail snubbed Norfolk Southern Corporation offer and decided to work with
CSX. Norfolk then mounted a legal and financial challenge to take over Conrail (Reber
et al., 2003). David R. Goode, CEO of Norfolk led the campaign to win the takeover bid
(Reber et al., 2003). The end result was that Norfolk successfully concluded its takeover
of Conrail in 1997.
Although Goode’s rhetoric in the media certainly supported his cause, the main
factor in the success was more likely due to legislative victories in court, as well as the
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ability of Norfolk to put together a better financial offer to Conrail shareholders. While
it would be helpful for the CEO to address the stakeholders, it is argued that a
competent spokesperson with enough credibility and seniority would suffice.
Economic downturns. In 1995, AT&T announced corporate restructuring plans.
Initially, the organization used simple denial when confronted about plans of massive
layoffs. It later announced plans to dismiss 40,000 workers.
The media reported negatively, and this was further compounded by the revelation
of CEO and Chairman Robert Allen’s excessive pay package. Even though Allen did
make public statements using bolstering by stating his empathy to those who were
laid-off and corrective actions by revising their lay-off targets and offering voluntary
buy-outs, its strategy failed because Allen’s high pay package became a sore point
(Christen, 2005). In this case, even when Allen did step up, it was not persuasive.
In a more recent event, Bear Stearns, one of the largest global investment banks,
was acquired by J.P. Morgan at an initial US$2 per share (Wright, 2008) and later at
US$10 upon re-negotiations (White, 2008). Alan Schwartz, CEO of Bear Stearns
stepped up initially and used a bolstering strategy to laud the move (Wright, 2008).
Jimmy Cayne, Chairman of Bear Stearns, later stepped up at the end of the crisis, to
apologize to shareholders and employees as Bear Stearns exited Wall Street (White,
2008). It is argued that both CEO and Chairman’s appearances made little impact to
mitigate the situation because of the nature of the crisis.
The third research question examined at what point should the CEO become the
organization spokesperson and what impact it has on the crisis. This is distilled into
three categories, at the beginning of the crisis; at the height of the crisis, and when the
crisis becomes unbearable.
When should the CEO step up?
At the beginning of the crisis. When the organization is perceived to have caused or
have the potential of causing widespread harm to society in general (as in the case of
Exxon-Valdez) or to individual members of the public through transgressions
committed by its staff or machinery, it is recommended that the CEO step up
immediately as the crisis begins to hit. The CEO’s appearance will set the tone of
engagement towards the organization’s internal and external publics, lay down the
organization’s stance on the matter, and assuage public concerns that such incidents
are viewed seriously and that the organization was doing everything it could to
rectify it. Having the organization’s top man face the public shows the severity at which
the organization views the crisis, and their resolve to return the situation to normalcy.
Stepping up early also applies to transgressions caused by the organization that
leads to a severe loss in reputation (as in the case of Merrill Lynch and Putnam). Again,
although there may not be loss of life or injury, the CEO’s appearance demonstrates the
organization’s recognition of its fault, and paves the way for further image repair.
At the height of the crisis. In instances where there is no clear accountability when
the crisis presented itself, it is recommended that the CEO not appear at the onset of the
crisis. This is especially true when there is a chance that the organization is liable for
causing the crisis. Aside from the legal implications of their involvement, the
uncertainty surrounding the issue can polarize the public even without sufficient
information. Having the CEO step up and take a stand puts the organization at a
greater risk of worsening the situation.
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Another instance when it is recommended the CEO appear only at the height of the
crisis is when the organization is forced to take a negative/unpopular stance. Even if
the position is justified, warranted, and backed up by facts, it is a bitter pill best served
by other authoritative spokespersons lower in rank than the CEO. Only when the
negative stance has been articulated and justified does the CEO need to appear to
assuage the public and soften the impact of their otherwise harsh position.
When the crisis becomes unbearable. In the event that an organization’s reputation is
threatened, the CEO must appear, regardless of the kind of crisis it is facing. This is
because the threat to the reputation becomes of paramount importance, and the
underlying circumstances that brought it up become secondary. Whatever remedies
the organization will present to correct the situation will be undermined by the fact that
trust in the organization is diminishing.
As the most authoritative figure in the organization, it is up to the CEO to arrest that
downward spiral. He will be the most credible person to diffuse the tension brought
about by the threat, and relieve pressure from the organization to prove itself, thereby
allowing them to continue on with the strategies that are meant to remedy the original
crisis.
Conclusion
This study has examined when the CEO should step up to be the organization
spokesperson, and if so, at what point must he step up.
There appears to be two recurring trends in the meta-analysis. First, in instances
where organizations have to reverse their initial stance, such as when they have to
go back on their word or overturn initial claims, often made by an organization
spokesperson, the CEO has to step up to give more credence to the new statement/stance.
Second, when a crisis involves the integrity of an organization, the CEO has to step up in
order to give the organization a strong, responsible face.
As an exploratory study, this study examined and reviewed crises that have happened.
Even though attention has been paid to examine every crisis type in Dier’s (2007)
typology, admittedly, some crises have more prominence, hence, more information are
available about them than others. In carrying out a meta-analysis, there are limitations the
authors had to accept. First, the authors have not been able to examine other contributing
factors in a crisis, such as the impact of the CEO’s personality (i.e. whether he is media
savvy, introverted, or stern) on crisis communication. Schoenberg (2005) argued for a
crisis leadership model that encompasses personal attributes like integrity, intelligence,
vision, courage, amongst others, that measure a leader’s authenticity and in turn enables
the leader to assert influence during crisis. Second, it is also not able to capture the effects
of the organization’s prior reputation with its publics before the crisis. Lyon and Cameron
(2004), for instance, examined the organization’s prior relationship with its publics and
found the “halo effect” in organizations with firm reputations as “shining stars of social
responsibility” (p. 231) to be usually afforded the benefit of the doubt in times of crises. In
that regard, a public apology during or after the crisis would reinforce the publics’
affection for the organization. Last but not least, it is not able to examine the level of
enlightenment of the CEO because that would determine whether the CEO would want to
step up in the first place. The level of enlightenment is one of the key measurements of the
characteristics of the dominant coalition in the contingency theory (Cancel et al., 1997),
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which has emerged to be a dominant theory in crisis and conflict management
(Pang, 2006). Further research can be carried out in the future examining these gaps.
Nonetheless, the authors have taken the critical first step to set the research in this
area in motion. It is hoped that this study provide a basic template that would
illuminate practical insights for corporate communications practitioners on when to
advise the CEO to front a crisis as spokesperson. To use military parlance, the CEO
does not need to appear in every battle as long as the CEO knows how to win the war.
The question this study had hoped to answer is how does the CEO know which battle
to front in order to get the optimal mileage.
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